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TORTS--VIOLATION OF A STATUTORY DuTY.-Plaintff, a stranger, was stand-
ing in front of defendant's truck helping make repairs at night. Defendant's
truck was parked on the traveled portion of the highway without flares as
required by statute.1 A third party struck defendant's truck pushing it over
plaintiff and injuring him. Held, defendant liable. Walters v. Rowls (Ind.
App. 1938), 16 N. E. (2d) 969.
A breach of statutory duty is negligence per se 2 towards a plaintiff if
the plaintiff is within the class of persons intended to be protected by the
statute and if the injury sustained was the type of risk the legislature sought
to prevent.3 The problem in this case is whether the connection of the risk
created by the defendant's conduct to the plaintiff's injury was within the
contemplation of the legislature in enacting the statute.
The court held the plaintiff was within the class of persons intended to
be protected by the statute requiring trucks parked at night on the highway
to display flares. In making this determination, however, the court discussed
two Michigan cases applying a statute requiring motorists approaching
pedestrians on the traveled portion of the highway to slow down to ten miles
per hour.4 Purporting to reason from the analogy of this statute the court
held the plaintiff came within the class of persons the Indiana statute was
designed to protect.5
1Burns' Ind. Stat. (1933), §§47-525 and -526; Baldwin's Ind. St. 1934,
§§ 11178 and 11179.
2 Some of the difficulty involved in this case might have been avoided by
use of the minority rule that the violation of a statute is only evidence of
negligence. Voiles v. Hunt (1922), 213 Iowa 1224, 240 N. W. 703; Miller v.
Burch (1929), 254 Ill. App. 387; Jones v. Co-op Assn. of Amer. (1912), 109
Me. 448, 84 A. 985; Neverett v. Patch (Mass. 1936), 4 N. E. (2d) 304; Clark
v. Boston & Me. R. Co. (1887), 64 N. H. 323; 10 A. 676; see Matz v. J. L.
Curtis Cartage Co. (1937), 132 Ohio St. 271, 7 N. E. (2d) 220, holding that
the violation of .a Public Utility Commission regulation requiring flares is
only evidence of negligence; Purol, Inc. v. Great Eastern System, Inc. (Pa.
1938), 197 A. 545.
See Lowndes, Civil Liability Created by Criminal Legislation, (1932), 16
Minn. L. Rev. 361, that the violation of a statute is an element of a tort
resting on negligence. This rule is advanced because the failure of the
legislature to provide expressly for criminal responsibility for the violation
of a penal statute argues against the adoption of the per se rule. 32 Col.
L. Rev. 712, contains an interesting discussion of the application of both
rules.
3 Gerlot v. Schwartz (1937), 212 Ind. 292, 7 N. E. (2d) 960. As to the
class of persons intended to be protected by the statute see Kelly v. Muhs
Co. (1904), 71 N. J. L. 358, 59 A. 23. As to the type of harm intended to be
prevented see Gorris v. Scott (1874), L. R. 9 Ex. 125. As to the require-
ment that the violation of the statute must be the proximate cause of the
plaintiff's injury, see Prest-O-Lite Co. v. Skeel (1914), 182 Ind. 593, 106 N.
E. 365, Ann. Cas..1917A 474 (holding the violation was not proximate cause) ;
Binford v. Johnston (1882), 82 Ind. 426. See generally, Harper, Law of
Torts, § 78, p. 193.
4White v. Edwards (1923), 222 Mich. 321, 192 N. W. 560; Nordman v.
Mechem (1924), 227 Mich. 86, 198 N. W. 586.
5 The court said, "By analogy the intent, purpose, and dangers to be elim-
inated by . . . our statute were similar to those comprehended within
the language of the Michigan statute. We conclude that . . . Rowls came
within the class of persons intended to be protected "
RECENT CASE NOTES
Although the argument from statutes by analogy is commendable,6 the
validity of the analogy in this case is questionable. The Michigan statute
specifically included the protection of pedestrians;? until this case arose
the only prior interpretation of the Indiana statute held it to include the
protection of motorists traveling on the highways at night from the danger
of striking trucks stalled without lights.8 This case first presented the problem
of whether the statute also included the protection of pedestrians standing
off the pavement on the berm; 9 until it is established that the Indiana flare
statute included the protection of that class of persons, the Michigan statute
is not analogous.' 0
The resolution of this issue may be effectuated by resort to principles of
statutory interpretation to determine the legislative intent"1 or by the com-
mon law doctrine of proximate cause treating the violation of a statute as
negligence per se.1 2 The court here chose the former method and attempted
6Jamison v. Encarnacion (1930), 281 U. S. 635, 50 S. Ct. 441. See Landis,
The Study of Legislation in Law Schools, (1931), 31 Harv. Grad. Mag. 433;
Landis, A Note on Statutory Interpretation, (1930), 43 Harv. L. Rev. 886.
7The prescribed standard of conduct is stated in relation to pedestrians.
"Upon approaching a person walking in the roadway of a public highway,
* . . a person operating a motor vehicle shall slow down to a speed not
exceeding ten miles an hour and give reasonable warning of its approach
and use every reasonable precaution to insure the safety of such person." 1
Comp. Laws of Mich. 1915, sec. 4818.
8 Gerlot v. Schwartz (1937), 212 Ind. 292, 7 N. E. (2d) 960.
9The Indiana statute is very similar to the following flare statutes of
other states: Colo. Code (1935), Vol. II, ch. 16, sec. 266; Conn. Supp; to Gen.
Statutes (1931, 1933, 1935), sec. 1598, subsec. 9; Dela. Code (1935), sec. 5641(d) ;
Ill. Rev. Statutes (1937), Ch. 95V2, sec. 218; Iowa Code (1935), sec. 5067 e 1;
Kans. Statutes, (1937) Supp. sec. 8-5108; Md. Code (1935) Supp., Art. 56, see.
193 (SA) ; Minn. Code (1938) Supp., see. 11-1801; N. Y. (1935) Supp. to Cahill
Consol. Laws, Ch. 64a, sec. 15(17). These do not indicate by any express
words to what class of persons the protection is extended. The following
cases involving flare statutes all are construed to give protection to motorists
or their passengers: Gerlot v. Schwartz (1937), 212 Ind. 294, 7 N. E. (2d)
960; TWA v. Northland Greyhound (1937), 201 Minn. 234, 275 N. W. 846;
Matz v. J. L. Curtis Cartage Co. (1937), 132 Ohio St. 271, 7 N. E. (2d) 220;
Perry v. Reich Bros. Long Is. Motor Freight, Inc. (1937), 300 N. Y. S.
142; Gaber v. Weinberg (1936), 324 Pa. 385, 188 A. 187. This Indiana case,
Walters v. Rowls, is the second case construing a flare statute to include
protection to pedestrians. Engle v. Nelson (1935), 220 Iowa 771, 263 N. W.
505 allowing a plaintiff standing on the berm to recover from a motorist who
swerved to avoid a truck parked without flares can be distinguished as the
court there held there was a substantial compliance with the statute by the
use of a flashlight as a warning. Singer v. Messina (1933), 312 Pa. 129,
167 A. 583, 89 A. L. R. 1271, involves a suit by a driver standing beside
his truck who was barred by contributory negligence.
10That the statute is also intended to protect against other highway
hazards beside striking a parked truck is apparent from the construction ap-
plied in the Engle case, note 9 supra, where the accident was caused by
the motorist swerving to avoid the truck.
11This requires the determination of the intent of the legislature if it
can be discovered, and if not discoverable, the application of rules of con-
struction to determine what a "reasonable legislature might have intended."
See Horack, In The Name of Legislative Intent, (1931), 38 W. Va. L. Q. 119.
12Lowndes, Civil Liability Created By Criminal Legislation, (1932), 16
Minn. L. Rev. 361; Thayer, Public Wrong and Private Action, (1914), 27
Harv. L. Rev. 317.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
to establish the legislative intent by reasoning from an analogous statute.
It might better have relied on a similar Indiana statute protecting pedestrians
than on a repealed Michigan statute.1 3
A possible solution would be the construction of all highway statutes of
the state in pari materia, and from an examination of the entire body of law
on this subject determine the highway statutes to be enacted to eliminate all
types of serious highway hazards. The court did not expressly assume this
position, but the use of the Michigan statute to determine the class of persons
protected by a statute is consistent only with this approach to the problem.' 4
B. W.
TRUSTS-APPORTIONMENT OF INCOME BETWEEN LIFE BENEFICIARY AND
REMAINDERMAN.-The testator created nine separate trusts, one for each of
eight relatives and the ninth to be known as the "Doctor E. G. Long Founda-
tion." The net income of each of the separate trusts (other than the founda-
tion) was to be paid to the respective beneficiaries for lifel and on their
deaths the principals were to be turned over to the foundation. On the death
of one of the life beneficiaries a controversy arose as to who was entitled to
the income accumulated, earned, and accrued, but undistributed at the date
of the life beneficiary's death. The lower court held that all the income ac-
cumulated, earned, and accrued but undistributed should be apportioned as
of the date of death and paid to her sole heir at law. On appeal, the judg-
ment was affirmed. St. Mary's Hospital of Evansville, Indiana v. Louis E.
Long (Ind. 1938), 17 N. E. (2d) 833.
On the death of a life beneficiary of a trust, a difficult problem as to the
apportionment of income therefrom between the life beneficiary and the re-
mainderman is presented. This is especially true when the trustee is in pos-
session of rents, dividends, annuities, and interest monies which have accrued
both before and after the termination of the life interest.
It is an elementary principle that the rights of the life tenant and the
remainderman depend upon the intention of the testator which is to be gathered
from the terms of the trust instrument taken as a whole and in the light
of all the surrounding circumstances.2  When such a rule of construction
ia See Burns' Ind. Stat. (1933), §47-513; Baldwin's Ind. St. 1934, §11166,
which is substantially the same statute as the Michigan statute. See Mich.
Comp. Laws 1929, Sec. 4696. Note that both the repealed Michigan statute
and the Indiana statute referred to pedestrians on the traveled portion of
the highway. See Fishman v. Eads (1929), 90 Ind. App. 137, 168 N. E. 495
allowing recovery to a pedestrian injured by the violation of this statute.
14 The statement is frequently found in Indiana decisions involving high-
way statutes that the statute is for "the protection of persons and property
lawfully upon the public highways of this state." See the instant case, also
Koplovitz v. Jensen (1925), 197 Ind. 475, 151 N. E. 390.
1 In the present case the life beneficiaries were to receive the income im-
mediately after receipt thereof by the trustee, but in order to make a uniform
time for payment and accounting, the life beneficiaries agreed with the trustee
to be paid quarterly. (See footnote 13 for further information on this point).
2Eustace v. Dickey (1921), 240 Mass. 55, 132 N. E. 852; Restatement,
Trusts (1935), § 235, comment f. "By the terms of the trust it may be pro-
vided that income otherwise apportionable shall not be apportioned or that
income otherwise not apportionable shall be apportioned."
